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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the performance of hedge fund during the recent financial 
crisis period starting August 2007 in the United State. The study primarily covers the 
period June 2007 to July 2012. We investigate the relative effect of the financial crisis 
on selected hedge fund strategy indexes of the CSFB Tremont. We tested the 
properties of hedge funds, stationarity of hedge funds NAV. To investigate the causal 
effect of the financial crisis on hedge fund strategy indexes, a risk factor model test 
was conducted on hedge fund indexes.  Six risk proxies was regressed against each of 
the hedge fund factors. Our findings suggest that hedge fund performance were 
affected in the recent financial crisis, although they still perform better than traditional 
asset classes in terms of annualized return and volatility. We also find that illiquidity 
and credit shortage characterized the financial crisis period. The result of the study 
supports the position of the literature that hedge funds perform better than traditional 
asset class in the current financial crisis. Therefore, holding the existing factors 
constant, hedge fund may still serve as a haven for investors during financial crisis. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
2.0 Theoretical Background of Hedge Funds (HFs) 
 
Performance of hedge funds during financial crisis continue to attract attention of 
study due to flexibility of the fund attributes during periods of economic shocks. 
Hence, this study will consider the performance of hedge fund in the recent financial 
crisis that started from 2007 August through 2012 July. For comparative purpose we 
will consider hedge fund performance in 2001 April – May 2006 as pre financial 
crisis period in particular part of the empirical study. 
The importance of hedge fund as described by the rate of capital inflow into this 
sector of investment cannot be over emphasized. Of particular relevance is the 
acclaimed superlative return of hedge fund. Despite the shrewdness of method of 
generating return by hedge fund managers, it still continues to attract huge and 
growing number of investors. A major contentious issue is the source of the high 
return of the hedge fund. With the risk associated with hedge funds, especially the 
lack of transparency, many questions are being asked not only by investors but also 
academician and professional not leaving behind the concerns of regulators of 
economies across the world where the funds are traded. 
 
Although there is no universal definition for hedge fund, all known definition of 
hedge fund fall within the same context. Hedge fund can be defined as an  
aggressively managed portfolio of investments that uses advanced investment 
strategies such as leveraged, long, short and derivative positions in both domestic and 
international markets with the goal of generating high returns (either in an absolute 
sense or over a specified market benchmark) Connor, & Mason Woo (2004).  
 
Alternatively , hedge funds may be  referred  to as 2/20 fund Lan et al., (2011), being 
the charge of hedge fund manager as 2% of invested fund as management fee plus 
20% of the return in excess of benchmark. 
  
In the last three decades, hedge fund has continually attracted the interest of 
investors in unprecedented manner. This claim is evident by the continuous increase 
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in the Asset Under Management of hedge fund managers, growing number of 
managers in the hedge fund industry and the increase deployment of resources of the 
traditional investors such mutual fund managers to hedge funds. 
Few reasons may have been acclaimed to have enabled the superlative performances 
HF managers  
• Skills commitment due to high incentive reward and reward structure that 
have acclaimed to generate “alpha returns”. 
• Low positive correlation with other asset classes- hedge fund return patterns 
are different from other traditional assets (diversification tool for portfolio 
managers) 
• Sophisticated investment strategies applied by manager to generate returns 
which includes futures, option ,and other derivatives 
• High level of risk undertaken in trading strategies, a reason that made HFs 
attracts peculiar type of investors due to inducement by investors. 
• Leveraging- Funding of most hedge managers position could attract as much 
as 50-60% of borrowing. 
• Involving of the hedge fund manager’s own fund in the investment portfolio. 
 
 
 
Chart 1- Growth in Hedge fund Industry (1996 -2007) 
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As a result, the fund allocated to the HF industry has continued to grow in 
value to date. The major reason for the growth  is attributable the high rate of absolute 
return over other investment  in other asset classes Hasanhodzic &  Lo, 
(2007).Although the S&P 500 outperformed HFs in the last four years (CHUNG, 
2013). That is hedge fund returns are not subject to market benchmarks. 
 
 
Chart2: Hedge Fund Long run Performance ( Jan.1990 – June 2008) 
 
 
Traditionally, the purpose of hedge fund was to secure investor positions from 
unexpected and unintended losses through hedging. The financial investment vehicle 
have since engaged other more usages particularly in the aspect of market speculation. 
Highly sophisticated means are deployed in hedge fund trading. Derivatives, options, 
futures all form part of hedge fund strategy that are aimed at exploiting market to 
fundamental differentials as it is common in  the event driven and equity long/short 
strategies of Hedge fund and others strategies. Many hedge funds have yielded 
double-digit returns to their investors and, in some cases, in a form that seems 
uncorrelated with general market swings and with relatively low volatility. Most 
hedge funds accomplish this by maintaining both long and short positions insecurities 
(hence the term ‘‘hedge fund’’) which, in principle, gives investors an opportunity to 
profit from both positive and negative information while, at the same time, providing 
some degree of market neutrality because of the simultaneous long and short 
positions. 
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Types of Investors in Hedge fund investment are partnership, private institutions but 
not public nor individuals. Mostly such investors are “utility- Sophisticated and high 
risk tolerant” investors. The list also includes offices, and high net-worth investors, 
hedge funds are now attracting major institutional investors such as large state and 
corporate pension funds and university and endowments. Asset under the control of 
hedge funds as at 2007 was estimated at $2.4trillion. Hedge funds have been proven 
to be stronger in bull markets. 
Currently hedge fund investments are made available to individuals investors through 
mutual funds, fund of funds (FoFs) and investment in hedge fund indexes, see 
Agarwal,V , Boyson,N.M & Naik, N.Y 2006) 
Of great interest is the magnitude of growth of hedge fund among investors (Chart1). 
Apart from sophisticated and high net worth individual, the coverage of hedge fund 
has been extended to other investors who can now invest in hedge fund through pool 
of fund contributed to hedge fund managers. For the benefit of diversification and 
overcoming the requirement to meet up with huge capital required for hedge fund 
investors, individuals can now invest in hedge funds through the Fund of Funds. 
 
The increase in coverage of hedge funds, the increased appetite of investors seeking 
for high returns, the need to recover from losses of economic downturns and the 
active involvements of mutual and pension fund managers in hedge fund are all 
factors that has increase the flow of fund into hedge fund investments. 
 
.Since hedge fund manager have managed to keep the secret of their trading or 
investment strategies, leverages and performance from disclosure and regulation. 
Studies have made several attempts to unbundle the returns of hedge funds due to the 
following reasons: 
ü The excessive charges of hedge fund managers that are deemed to be from 
fraudulent claims of alpha return and market timing 
ü Secrecy of hedge fund managers that shrewd investors from understanding the 
true return and the actual level of risk undertaken by hedge funds managers. 
ü Leveraging exposure of hedge funds through margin account and 
collaterization are highly risky and are kept secret by the managers. 
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ü Non disclosure of true track records of performance, risk profile , trade 
strategies among other factors; forced the need to research about an alternative 
means to generate a” hedge fund like” return with alternative instruments 
which can be more transparent. 
 
In order to resolve the challenges of transparency in hedge funds, researchers have 
made several successful attempts to identify the true sources on hedge fund returns. In 
most case the α alpha ( idiosyncratic- return due to manager’s skill)) return and  β 
systematic return are main sources  Also, attempts were made to understand the effect 
of common risk factors on individual hedge fund strategies. The purpose is to be able 
to create financial instrument that could generate such superlative performances but 
without having to keep the challenges of hedge funds. 
 
In (Lo.A 2001, Giamouridis 2010, Dupliech et’al) all contributed to hedge fund 
characteristics replication. Conclusion from the study of (Lo, A 2001) find that 
although hedge fund has gained popularity among pension fund, government 
institution, mutual fund; the success of replication of the instrument is not yet a total 
success. 
 
The major challenge of hedge fund replication is that not all hedge fund “strategies 
return” can be replicated. The challenges of creating exotic options that can give same 
result as the hedge fund are excessively complex and can be impossible sometimes 
Lo, A (2001). In addition, alpha returns which is the basis of replication, requires that 
all the common risk factors that generates the alpha return of the fund to be replicated 
be identified, this may not be totally capturable. However, sources of return in hedge 
funds are not clear to date (Kat, HM2004), neither are the alpha returns. Therefore, a 
complete replacement of hedge funds returns with cloned funds may not be totally 
conclusive, otherwise the opaqueness and high fees charged by the hedge fund 
manager could make the clones a preferred option for all stake holders. 
 
3.0 CAUSES OF THE 2007/2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
With  the level of leverage in hedge fund that are directed at magnifying profits, the 
intermediation role of hedge funds and connectivity of financial system, it may just be 
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noble to check the possible link the hedge fund industry may have with the recent 
financial crisis.The 2007/2008 financial economic crisis is similar to past crises in 
many dimensions according to Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a, 2008b, 2009).The 
commonality signs include that systemic banking crises are characteristically 
preceded by credit booms and asset price bubbles.  The study of Herring and Watcher 
(2003)   show that many financial crises are the result of bubbles in real estate 
markets. 
 
In the case of the recent financial crisis in the US and the world, an event that 
culminated in to the financial economic crisis according to Adrian and Shin (2009), 
Brunnermeier (2009), Greenlaw et al. (2008), and Taylor (2008) can be traced to the 
low interest rate policies adopted by the Federal Reserve and other central banks after 
the collapse of the technology stock bubble that increased public expenditure and cash 
in circulation. In addition, the appetite of Asian central banks for (debt) securities 
contributed to lax credit. 
 
 These factors helped fuel a dramatic increase in house prices in the U.S. and several 
other countries such as the U.K., Ireland and Spain. In 2006 this bubble reached its 
peak in the U.S. and house prices there and elsewhere started to fall. Mayer, Pence 
and Sherlund (2009) and Nadauld and Sherlund (2008) provide excellent accounts 
over the developments of the housing market preceding the crisis. 
 
The financial system and in particular banks came under tremendous pressure during 
this time, the real economy was not much affected. The significant change occurred   
September 2008 when Lehman’s demise forced markets to re-assess risk. While 
Lehman's bankruptcy induced substantial losses to several counterparties, its more 
disruptive consequence was the signal it sent to the international markets. 
 
This resulted in financial contagion and bank runs, a consequence of bank illiquidity. 
Re-assessing risks previously overlooked; investors withdrew from the markets and 
liquidity dried up. In the months that followed and the first quarter of 2009 economic 
activity in the U.S. and many other countries declined significantly. Unemployment 
rose dramatically as a result. There is a consensus to qualify the crisis as the worst 
since the Great Depression. 
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According to Claessens, Köse and Terrones (2010) the differences of the 2007/2008 
financial economic crisis from the past could be that there was multiplicity in use of 
complex and opaque financial instruments. Secondly, the interconnectedness among 
financial markets nationally and internationally, with the United States at the core of 
the challenge. Secondly,risk had increased in a short time period. Third, the degree of 
leverage of financial institutions accelerated sharply. Fourth, the household sector 
played a central role.  
 
The losses of the financial  crisis 2008 are enormous. According to Brunnermeier, 
M.K (2009) $8 trillion of U.S. stock market wealth lost between October 2007, when 
the stock market reached an all-time high, and October 2008. Hedge funds are know 
to play prominent intermediary role in financial system. With US harboring 70% of 
the world hedge fund market shortly before 2007 and considering the rate at which 
hedge fund investment has been growing, we might be tempted to ask if  the financial 
crisis was not caused by hedge funds. This is particularly important, because the 
systematic collapse affect market credit and liquidity. The liquidity functions of hedge 
funds expectedly were hampered. The next sub topic compares the present and the 
past financial crisis in relation to hedge funds functions in financial market. The 
reason is to help understand if hedge fund has a link to the current financial crisis. 
 
2.1 COMPARISON OF THE PAST FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE PRESENT 
The current financial economic crisis started particularly in the United States in 
August 2007. Although there seems to be suggestive evidence that there are some 
improvement in economic in third quarter of 2010 due to federal Reserve intervention 
with a bail out as shown in the chart below. There are sign to proof that the financial 
crisis are not yet over until now Simeon ,J (2011) 
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Chart:3 Bail out for the US crisis by the Federal Reserve. 
 
We attempt to compare the past financial economic crisis in terms of their common 
causes and effects and the differences with the present, in order to infer possible 
relationship. The understanding of the comparison analysis might provide insight into 
common cause of problem in the financial system of the past and the present. 
 
2.1.1 Financial Crisis 1990 and 2000 (European currency crisis) 
In this case the effect of currency speculation by George Sorros (Quantum Fund) in 
1990 using Global Macro fund (GMF) destabilized the financial market. The GMF 
was speculated against the fixed European exchange rate. Soros base the speculation 
on the premise that the fixed exchange rate is not duly represented by the market 
fundamentals. This implies disequilibrium which was expected to revert in the future. 
Soros sold large volume of Swedish Krona and British pound among other currencies 
against US dollar forward rate in a short position. The attempt by the various central 
banks to defend the currencies positions failed. The currencies declined in value and 
Soros (Quantum Fund) made $1.8 billion in a month. 
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Although Soros (Quantum fund) was accused of price manipulation, Soros submitted 
that in a situation of erroneous economic policy, price adjustment cannot be 
avoidable. The true position is that the price adjustment was pressurized by the 
speculation; otherwise the price adjustment would have reverted systematically 
without such as serious impact. Therefore Soros speculation pressurized the impact of 
the consequence of market fundamental reversal rather being the cause of the 
financial market destabilization. The chart below explains the market reaction during 
Soros speculation. A plot performance of graph of the Quantum, Global Macro fund 
with the Swedish Krona and British pound. 
Chart:4. Global Macro Fund – Crisis 1992 
 
 
2.1.2 Asian Crisis (1997 -1999) 
In the mid 1990, a number of South East Asian countries have huge deficit in their 
international current account. The fixed exchange rate against the US dollar 
contributed to domestic borrowing in foreign currencies, this situation in turn led to 
exposure to currency risk. The resultant reversal of the inflow of international capital 
into outflow which affect the current account balances made  the fixed exchange rate 
un defendable. The result is a devaluation of the currency in some Asian countries. 
Thailand devalued its currency in July 1997 and later followed by Malaysia and South 
Korea. The devaluation led to the adjustment of financial asset prices. 
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IMF was called to investigate the allegation that Hedge fund had launched speculation 
attack of the Asian Currency by holding high volume of short position, thereby 
forcing the currency to devalue (Eichengreen et’al 1998). 
 
The conclusion on the Asian crisis was that .the financial bubble was as a result of 
structural imbalances in the financial system and was not caused by hedge fund 
speculation. 
 
The differences between the Asian crisis and the 1990 crisis is that; the 1990 crisis 
could be traceable to individual (George Soros) unlike the Asian crisis. Panic on the 
part of international investors resulted to their capital withdrawal from the economic 
system. Hedge fund was therefore not the cause of the Asian crisis. See Chart 2 below 
for the comparison Hedge fund index, Emerging market Hedge Fund index and MSCI 
stock index (Asia). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart5: Asian Crisis (1997 -1999) 
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2.1.3 IT bubble -1999 
Exponential increase in prices of IT related shares that mis match actual  companies 
value and profit became untenable in March 2000 when the trend reversed and the 
price of the IT related shares fell dramatically. 
Hedge fund may not have played the role arbitrageur, otherwise they should have 
counteracted the abnormally price increase by taking short positions on IT shares. 
According to the research of Nagel (2004), hedge fund held extensive long positions 
in IT shares as opposed to the short position that it was accused of holding 
excessively. The hedge fund only reduced the long position before the crash of the IT 
bubble. 
 
In line with the study of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), hedge funds were aware that 
there was bubble in the market, but all they did was to ride on the wave of the market. 
Although, the suspicion that hedge funds affected IT prices downturn could have been 
caused by taking long position in the IT shares to drive up prices or shorting IT shares 
to cause a serious fall in prices. But for such Long or Short sales to have affected IT 
shares, there must large volume trade and a relatively liquid market. The Chart 6 
Blow compares Hedge Funds returns in the period and the S&P 500 (a proxy for IT 
share) 
 
 
 
Chart6: IT stock Bubble 1999 
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2.1.4 Long Term Capital Management (LTCM 1998) 
In LTCM, issue of leverage as a risk is the main focus. The LTCM had equity worth 
$5billion but hold an outrageous leverage position of $125 billion. The fund strategy 
was to trade on arbitrage opportunities particularly on bond market. The fund invest 
on the premise of mispricing in floated bond. The projection strategy of the LTCM 
was base on value differential on interest rate of bond issued at different times, but 
has the same maturity; conventionally, such values are expected to converge. The 
financial system of Russia collapse , the expected position reversed, the case  made 
the interest rate to diverge further. The losses became magnified due to the huge 
leverage position. The Federal Reserve intervened to rescue the negative effect of 
imminent collapse .of the entire financial system. 
 
The LTCM event points to two inferences; firstly, there are high risks associated with 
huge leverage in investment positions. Secondly, hedge fund can be regarded as 
systematically important. The Chart 4 below describes relationship between the 
Hedge Fund index and the MSCI World Equity index 
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Chart7: Long Term Capital Management (LTCM 1998) 
 
 
As a conclusion, only the LTCM financial system collapse can be attributable to 
hedge fund activities in the financial system. 
 
3.0 HEDGE FUND AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM INTERACTION 
 
Chan, Getmansky, Haas &  Lo 2005, describe systemic risk as a series of correlated 
defaults among financial institutions. The hedge fund Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) in 1998 seemed to confirm fears that heavy losses by hedge 
funds have the potential to drain significant liquidity from key financial markets. For 
example, many funds had to close out positions during the LTCM crisis to meet 
margin calls and satisfy risk management constraints. The consequence is a strain on 
market liquidity as experience in the Lehman brother prime mortgage crisis of 2008 in 
the US. The same was evidenced in the subprime housing mortgage of 2008. The 
liquidity mop was easily transmitted to the global financial market.  
 
The impact of financial economic crisis cannot be imagined with hedge fund a 
flexible investment vehicle, which operate with a liberal control in the financial 
system. Given the fact that US is home to two third of the global Hedge fund 
investment as at 2007; then it might be reasonable to reason what could be the impact 
of the financial crisis on such loosely regulated investment vehicle. Of particular 
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importance is the impact of financial leverage to failure in a financial system such as 
that of subprime mortgage in 2007, when the market became illiquid. Hedge funds are 
known to be highly leveraged.  In addition , the primary function of liquidity supply 
by the hedge fund was allege to be gradually abandon by hedge fund for more 
sophisticated speculative investment function, aimed at exploiting market gains. 
 
Due to financial intermediation role of hedge funds, abandoning such role could pose 
the threat of the possibility of liquidation to highly of leverage institution. Excessive 
borrow position  may lead to volatility and sharp asset price, when there is pressure to 
close position due to inability to meat up obligation(Working Group on Financial 
Markets (1999). 
 
Secondly, there could be a possibility   for contraction in economic activities, which 
may erupt as a result of are uncertainty about credit risk and intermediation as in  the 
case of the subprime mortgage in US. Activities of hedge funds through their 
counterparty exposures, for example, short-run financing for leveraged positions, 
prime  brokerage activity, and trading counterparty exposures in over the-counter and 
other markets may then be expose to risk at the same time. 
 
As an extension, if a bank has a large exposure to a hedge fund that defaults or 
operates in markets where prices are falling rapidly, the bank’s greater exposure to 
risk may reduce its ability or willingness to extend credit to worthy borrowers. 
Collateralizing the credit exposures may not be enough to mitigate the risk. Therefore 
a sudden decline in asset prices triggered, for example, the unwinding of a highly 
leveraged hedge fund positions to reduce the value of that collateral, or generate 
liquidity risk and further price declines via variation margining.  
 
A fall in asset values may reduce collateral values and thus hinder the ability of firms 
to borrow, which amplifies the impact of the initial shock. In (European Central Bank 
2006; Chan et al. 2006).Recent evidences  suggest that recently, hedge funds are  
increasingly moving  into less liquid markets, with structured credit and distressed 
debt at the top of the list In the presence of leverage, the combination of relatively 
illiquid assets and short-term financing exposes the hedge fund to possibly significant 
liquidity risk. 
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Also, longer lock-up periods on their investors’ ability to withdraw funds, which gives 
fund managers added flexibility to ride out market fluctuations (European Central 
Bank 2006; Mercer Oliver Wyman 2006). Mercer Oliver Wyman also points out the 
increased use of gates and notice periods for investor redemption, as well as 
contractual changes on the part of broker-dealers to increase transparency on hedge 
funds’ liquidity positions. All of these market mechanisms act to reduce liquidity risk 
for hedge funds 
. 
Considering hedge fund trading strategies; the use of derivatives and hedge fund may 
not have caused the financial crisis, but they could have aggravated the effect 
according to Shleifer , A Vishny , R & Myron S.( 2011). Hedge funds for example 
utilize quantitative models to execute “gamma trading” strategies, which means 
taking a long volatility (referring to volatility of the underlying stock) exposure. Many 
hedge funds, for example, utilize convertible arbitrage strategies, which involve 
taking advantage of pricing inefficiencies of convertible securities, which are the 
equivalent of holding a bond position and an option on some underlying stock.  
 
According to Tremont Advisors, convertible arbitrage total market value grew from 
$768 million in 1994 to $25.6 billion in 2002 (Hutchinson and Gallagher, 2005, Hoje 
Jo, Claudia Lee , Munguia , A & Nguyen , C (2012),). The strategy involves 
purchasing the convertible security, while shorting the underlying shares for which 
the security has an option, effectively taking advantage of pricing disparities between 
the two. The relative price movements occur when the credit profile of the company 
changes, the market changes its perception of the said credit, the market or the market 
premium paid for a given level of credit risk changes (Jaeger, 2008); there is a shift in 
the volatility of the underlying equity or the market premium paid for a given level of 
volatility changes; and interest rate movements change market yield requirements 
(Jaeger, 2008).The diagram below show a distribution of hedge fund style up till 
2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 23 of 48 
 
Chart8: Distribution of hedge fund strategies  (1990 – 2008) 
 
 
We therefore assume that there is a high level of interaction between the financial 
systems and hedge funds. Base on this assumption, we expect that hedge fund 
performance may have been affect in the current financial crisis. Particularly 
guiding this reasoning is the illiquidity consequence of the financial system 
challenge. This reason therefore forms the background of the rationale for thesis.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized thus;.4.0 covers the rationale for study 
(Research questions, hypothesis).5.0 has methodology (also Data validation) as 
subheading. 6.0 cover the literature review and 7.0 the summary statistics (Jarque 
Bera Normality test Analysis ,Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF), 
autocorrelation correction and autocorrelation as a measure of Illiquidity risk. 
Finally we have the conclusion and recommendation  
 
4.0 RATIONALE FOR STUDY 
Motivated by failure of the two Bear Sterns hedge funds at the beginning of the 
financial crisis in 2007, this paper examines why some hedge funds failed during 
and after the recent financial crisis, and why some also survived. We consider that 
with the flexibility of hedge funds, it volume in the US economy, its trend of 
exponential growth in the world and possible economic significance and 
importance in financial sector, we reasoned that the hedge fund investment in 
capable of being affected in financial downturn. Loss in hedge funds is better 
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imagined due to the level of leverage involved with hedge funds investments. I 
therefore consider investigating performance of hedge funds across it strategies to 
gain understanding into how differently hedge funds styles are affected by the 
recent financial crisis 
 
4.1 Research Questions 
 
We therefore pose these questions to gain the understanding into how the current 
financial crisis affects the performance of hedge funds: 
 
v Does financial economic crisis affected the superlative performance of 
hedge funds? 
 
v Does the risk of hedge fund increase due to the exogeneuous shock of the 
financial crisis? 
 
v Does any risk factor play a more significant role in the performance of 
hedge funds across strategies? 
 
v Does illiquidity in hedge funds increase during the financial crisis? 
 
       4.3 Hypothesis 
 
We test the following hypothesis to provide the answer to the questions posed 
above. 
HYPOTHESIS 
1.        Ho =the mean of the hedge fund strategy index data are not normally 
distributed 
               Ho = the annual volatility of the hedge fund strategy index data are not 
normal 
       2.       Ho = data of hedge fund strategy index has not unit root 
                 
       3.       Ho = the data hedge fund strategy index has not autocorrelation                               
 
 4.    Ho = correlation coefficient for data hedge fund strategy index has not    
increased during financial crisis. 
 
5      Ho = the serial autocorrelation is not different for hedge fund data during   
financial crisis 
 
 
5.0 METHODOLOGY 
Using empirical data analysis we provide answer to the question posed in this 
thesis. The significance of the hedge fund as investment vehicle in US economy, 
which is home to not less than two third of the global hedge fund investment in 
2007 cannot be overemphasized. With the level of leverage, less transparency, 
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asset under management and the styles of investments in hedge funds  it could 
almost be concluded that hedge funds  harbors a high degree of systemic risk. This 
conclusion may almost be more significant when the liquidity and credit constrain 
of the last economic crisis is considered. 
 
In order to study the effect of the financial crisis on the hedge fund, we made 
comparison among randomly selected hedge fund strategies of the CSFB Tremont 
hedge funds. The CSFB Tremont of or the Credit Suisse has a total of thirteen 
styles or strategies, out of which we randomly selected seven. The selected seven 
strategies chosen because of time constrain.  
 
This study apply the approach in the contribution of Billio,M. Getmansky,M.& 
Pelizzon,L( 2010) in the study of risk of hedge funds. Although, the high risk 
adjusted returns, diversification/uncorrelated returns with equity market are 
notable key objectives that make investors choose hedge fund. Hedge fund 
performance measurement according to him, particularly in periods of exogenous 
shocks in the market requires more than the ordinary return per risk approach as in 
the application of Sharpe ratio. Getmansky,M, Lo, A. & Makarov, I (2004) using 
the financial econometric approach we evaluate the effect of financial crisis on 
hedge fund returns 
 
Hedge fund data are characteristically serial correlated. According to Lo,A ( 2001) 
when data are serially correlated , it has the tendency  to arrive at wrong estimates. 
There is high possibility for wrong prediction and wrong decision making, when 
decision  are base on such data. This study tested for the effect of serial correlation 
on the seven selected hedge fund strategies. The approaches in this study are 
described below; 
 
Seven hedge fund style indexes was selected from database of the CSFB Tremont 
base on categorization as directional and non directional strategies. CSHFI, 
CSMGDFUT, CSEQLS and CSGLMA for the group of directional hedge funds. 
CSEVDRRISKARB, CSFIINCARB and HFCONARB are non directional. The 
index of the funds strategies   that were downloaded are abbreviated as 
CSEVDRRISKARB, CSFIINCARB, CSHFI, CSMGDFUT  ,HFCONARB, 
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CSEQLS and CSGLMA. The data downloaded covered June2006 to July 2012 i.e 
62 months’ data. 
  
 We applied Eviews 6 software, to the seven randomly selected hedge fund style 
index of CSFB Tremont. First we examined the properties of the fund such as the  
annual mean, annual standard deviation, median return, minimum return, 
maximum return. In addition, we examine the distribution properties such as the 
skewness, kurtosis, R square and the Jarque Bera test of normality distribution. 
 
 Secondly we tested the stationary of the data, since we desire that the time series 
data is stationary. The unit root testing of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test was 
applied using the Schwatz criterion. Hypothesizing; we checked for the unit root 
of the hedge funds indexes. Using E views 6, the ADF (Augmented Dickey 
Fuller) test of unit root or stationairity was applied. In order to confirm the 
presence of unit root, the criteria is that the P value must be greater than 5%, and 
the ADF test statistics must be lower than the test critical values at the first level 
(I,e as raw data) for 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. This condition must be 
satisfied at all the level of the (i) intercept (ii) Intercept and Trend (iii) Non of the 
intercept an trend. If the above condition for the ADF test statistics and p value are 
met, then there is a unit root. This implies that the data is serially correlated.  
 
 Since we confirmed the presence of unit root or that the data are non stationary, 
the ADF Augmented Dickey Fuller test was applied at first difference. All the 
effect of non stationary was not removed from all of the hedge fund styles at first 
difference. We took the log of the data and applied the ADF at first difference. At 
that point, all the non stationary effect was removed. The process of stationary test 
and correction was carried out on six risk proxies (S&P 500, Moody spread, Vix 
Volatility index, USindex, Russell 2000 and 1000 difference, USSGIND 10yr 
Bond less USSGIND 3month ) 
  
With E views 6, we drew a line graph to examine the trend of the funds in the 
years under consideration to see if there was a downward trend during the 
financial crisis period. 
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Thirdly, we test the effect of six risk proxies on each of the seven hedge fund . 
Applying OLS multifactor loading model, the approach in Billio 2010. The 
econometric method used is a multi regression OLS analysis of hedge fund index 
strategy on selected risk proxies to test the exposure of the hedge fund to risk 
factors.  
 
            Y α + β1X1 + β2X2 + … βkXk …………………………………...(i) 
 
Y = the dependent variable (various hedge fund strategy in our case) 
            α = is the intercept of individual regression 
 β1.. βk   = Slope or Beta  coefficient  of relationship between  risk factors and            
the  returns of the hedge fund strategy  index 
Χ1..Χκ   = Independent variable that is explaining the variance in Y 
  
The purpose is to observe the common risk effect on the returns of each of the 
strategies. To execute this task, we regressed  the return of the each of the fund 
against the six common risk factors. The correlation coefficient or the effect by 
which each risk proxies affect the return of the individual hedge fund strategies 
was obtain as a coefficient from each equation and also the t statistics. Further, we 
carried out the Breuch Godfrey test of serial correlation on the residual of each of 
the equation to test for the validity of the regression assumption that serial 
dependence has not been included in the regression that could lead to a misleading 
result. Referencing  Getmansky,M, Lo, A. & Makarov, I (2004)  without 
removing the effect of autocorrelation  we cannot run a correct model.  
 
 
The selected six risk measure proxies (all sourced from Blommberg) are: Moody 
Bond spread (difference between BAA and AAA rated bond), Difference between 
Russell 2000 and 1000 as a proxy to measure sensitivity to large and small 
capitalization. Difference between the USSG10YR:IND bond and 3Months 
treasury bill as a proxy for credit spread was obtained from Bloomberg. The 
volatility index VIX data was downloaded as a measure of market volatility. Also, 
were the US dollar market and S&P500 index data. The data obtained for S&P 
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500 and volatility index (VIX) were in excess of the T bill return (as in Billioy,M. 
Getmansky,M.& Pelizzon,L( 2010). 
 
We regress each of the hedge fund strategy index  against the six  risk proxies  to 
obtain the sensitivity ’β’  and the idiosyncratic return  ΄’α’of each  hedge fund 
strategy index. In addition to the data above, we also estimate the adjusted R 
square and the t statistics for each of the coefficient. The importance of the 
regression is to explain the relevance of each risk proxies to each hedge fund 
strategies. 
 
Liquidity is an important factor in the recent financial crisis. According to the 
literature in the studies by Kart, M.K(2004),  the effect of autocorrelation depict 
illiquidity. Measuring the autocorrelation effect of each of the hedge fund strategy 
indexes, we identify the magnitude of autocorrelation /serial correlation on each of 
the hedge fund strategies indexes. The Ljung Q statistic was applied in 
correlelogram .We hypothesis that there is no auto correlation effect on the hedge 
funds indexes. We examine the autocorrelation property of the seven hedge fund 
strategies at first difference of the NAV returns, comparing between pre financial 
crisis period 2001-2006 and 2007 -2012 financial crisis period(62 months each). 
The autocorrelation order are compared  for the pre financial crisis and financial 
crisis period to understand the impact of the financial crisis. 
 
5.1 DATA AND VALIDATION 
The subprime mortgage illiquidity that cause the market collapse in the US started 
in August 2007 and through global contagion , the financial crisis was transmitted 
to other parts of the world in 2008: according to Pedersen, H.L (2009).   Although 
there seems to be a reverse in the down ward trend in capital market with stock re 
bounce back to their original prices, it will be a hurry conclusion to affirm that the 
financial economic crisis is finally over.   
 
To study if the financial economic crisis affected hedge fund performance,we 
tested seven hedge fund strategies index. According to Getmansky,M, Lo, A. & 
Makarov, I (2004), to appraise the performance of hedge fund, Net Asset Value 
are preferable due to illiquid nature of hedge fund ,which make the prices of its 
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assets not readily available on data bases on daily basis like stocks. Higher 
liquidity is generally believed to lead to more effective pricing.  Hence, hedge 
funds being illiquid are priced on their net asset value. Also called book value, net 
asset value is the total of all the fund’s assets minus all the fund’s liabilities.  
 Since neither weekly nor daily NAV of hedge funds are available in Credit Suisse 
Tremont, the monthly data was downloaded; the same as in the studies of Monica 
Billioy,M.,Mila Getmansky,M.& Pelizzon,L( 2010). 
 
62 months   NAV (net asset value) data was downloaded from Credit Suisse 
Tremont database for six randomly selected hedge fund strategies indexes and the 
credit Suisse composite index. The data downloaded cover a period between 
June2007 and July 2012. The month of June2012 was chosen to allow the market 
a two month to absorb all the information due from the shock of the financial 
market system, the failure that actually started in August 2007 in the US. The 
selected hedge fund strategies includes Dow Jones credit Suisse Composite index, 
Credit Suisse equity long /short index, Credit Suisse event driven risk arbitrage 
index ,Credit Suisse fixed income arbitrage index, Credit Suisse Global  Macro  
index, Credit Suisse Fixed income index and Credit Suisse Convertible arbitrage. 
All the hedge fund strategies stated above are abbreviated as - DJCSTB, CSEQLS, 
CSEVDRRISKARB, CSFIINCARB, CSGLMA, CSHFI and HFCONARB. Each 
of the index consider above are returns after risk free; as the difference between 
the return of the hedge funds and the 3 month USSG Treasury bill. This  
difference was taken to be able to measure the excess over market return. 
 
6.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study uses the approach in the studies of Billio, M , Getmansky, M and 
Pelizon, L (2010) of crisis and hedge fund risk. Past studies have applied different 
approaches to measure the performances of hedge funds in financial crisis. 
Methods applied includes return desmoothing, regime switch, lock up periods, 
factor loadings. 
 
Also, Chan et al. (2006, 2007) and Lo (2008) attempt to quantify the potential 
impact of hedge funds on systemic risk by developing a number of new risk 
measures for hedge funds and applying them to individual and aggregate hedge-
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fund returns data. These measures include: illiquidity risk exposure, nonlinear 
factor models for hedge-fund and banking-sector indexes, logistic regression 
analysis of hedge-fund liquidation probabilities, and aggregate measures of 
volatility and distress based on regime-switching models. The result of the past 
studies provide a warning  signs of potential dislocation in the hedge-fund 
industry. This implies that hedge fund may soon stop generating profit 
 
Bali et. al (2011) analyzed  hedge funds' exposures to various financial and 
macroeconomic risk factors. use univariate, bivariate, and multivariate estimates 
and investigate performance of these factor loadings (betas) in predicting the cross 
sectional variation in hedge fund returns. They find significantly positive 
(negative) link between default premium beta (inflation beta) and future hedge 
fund return. The results are robust across different subsample periods and states of 
the economy, and after controlling for market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum factors as well as the trend-following factors in stocks, short-term 
interest rates, currencies, bonds, and commodities 
 
Billioy, Getmanskyz & Pelizzonx (2010) demonstrated the effect of common risk 
factor on hedge fund strategies in financial economic crises. Liquidity, credit and 
idiosyncratic volatility  as common risk factors were tested on hedge fund 
strategies. Particularly, they demo started that hedge fund strategies have more 
exposure to systematic risk factors during financial crisis period and this result is 
consistent for both LTC 1998 capital crisis and 2008 financial economic crisis. 
 
Also, Brunnermeier (2008) and Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2008) maintained that 
hedge funds could be affected by financial crises through many mechanisms: 
direct exposure, funding liquidity, market liquidity, loss and margin spirals, runs 
on hedge funds, and aversion to Knightian uncertainty. In addition, Fung,et’al 
(2008), stated that large proportion of the variation in hedge fund returns can be 
explained by market-related factors (see, for example, Fung and Hsieh 
(1997,2001, 2002, 2004a, 2004b), Agarwal and Naik (2004) , and Hasanhodzic 
and Lo (2006) 
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According to Lo (2009) leverage, liquidity, correlation, concentration, sensitivities 
and connectedness can be tested for hedge funds with different proxies. 
Getmansky,M, Lo,A.W & Makarov, I (2004), estimated smoothing coefficients 
across 908 hedge funds in TASS data base and found that effect  of estimate 
smoothing  coefficient varies for different hedge-fund style categories and may be 
a useful proxy for quantifying illiquidity exposure. The most widely accepted risk 
measure metric in financial market focuses on volatility in return of asset. The 
volatility of portfolio returns depends on the variance and the covariance between 
the risk factors of the portfolio and the sensitivity of hedge fund returns. 
 
Emphasizing liquidity, Ang, A. and J. Chen, 2002  aprovided another empirical 
support for the work of Brunnermeier and Pedersenon (2010) on the Market 
liquidity and funding liquidity. The fact that the role of leverage is highly 
significant and increases the probability of failure during the crisis period can also 
explain how forced liquidation may be triggered by hedge funds’ margin increase 
during bear market. Although hedge fund managers misrepresent the risk hedge 
funds to investors, the effect is that other investors other than the appropriate 
owners of the risk bear the consequence of the disruptive effect created by the 
hedge fund managers. Lo, and Makarov (2004) propose simple measures of 
illiquidity risk exposures that can also be applied to the financial system.  
 
Also, Ang et al. (2011) find that financial leverage decreases during financial 
crisis period because the funds sell some of their liquid assets to meet  margin 
requirements and that forces some funds into liquidation. When liquidity dries up 
in the market, trading activity or volume may be reduced. Regular market stability 
may be experienced especially in a downward trend, there is suggestive tendencies 
for low volatility 
 
Kart, H.M (2004) describes the autocorrelation properties of hedge fund as means 
to measure illiquidity in hedge funds. According to his findings, first difference of 
returns of S&P500 displays lesser autocorrelation compare to hedge funds due to 
matching to market. This implies that closing prices of the S&P 500 are easily 
determined by the market due to active trading. Due to illiquidity in financial 
crisis hedge fund autocorrelation affected may be on the increase. 
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. 7.0 SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
7.1 Jarque Bera Normality test 
Hypothesis (B) Jarque Bera Normality test; JB (1981) tests whether the 
coefficients of skewness and excess kurtosis are jointly 0 or normal distribution of 
returns. The test explains the distribution properties of data  by  indicating the 
skewness (third moment)  in the tail of data distribution as either left or right 
biased; if they are not symmetrical.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For kurtosis or the fourth moment property which is only normal for a height of 3, 
any value in excess of 3 is considered leptokurtic. For JB criteria, we check 
critical value at 5% level for 2 degrees of freedom. If JB>X sqaure (chi), then data 
is not normally distributed.We examine this property among the hedge fund 
strategy index NAV returns, the results are stated in the( APPENDIX- TAB1) 
 
Jarque Bera Normality test hypothesis 
 
Ho =The annual mean of the hedge fund strategy index data are not normally 
distributed 
 
See Table 1,  we find that  all hedge fund strategy index display negative 
skewness except  Global Macro fund  which has  positive skewness. f The 
CSEQLS   has a the hihest  negative skewness of -0.730624, followed by 
CSFIINCARB with -0.713109 and the strategy fund index index with the lowest  
negative skewness is CSEVDRRISKARB with  -0.280508. The result is not 
surprising because both Fixed Income Arbitrage and Event Driven Risk Arbitrage 
fund will thrive well on a good credit facility market. Credit availalbiltiy was tight 
during the period under consideration and could add to the reason for all the 
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magnitude of negative skewness. EQLS are known to exhibit negative skewness 
or fat  tails. 
 
 Conversely, we find that Global Macro Fund has a  skewness of 0.22. Consistent 
with the finding of Mark JP Anson, CAIA Level I (2005)) Global Macro fund are 
expected to have positive skew with low level of leptokurtosis  is our finding, 
where the Global macro fund displayed a skewness of 0.22 and no leptokurtosis. 
A desirable result for investor is a positive risk, that means upside risk exceed 
downside risk.  The  outcome  that the Global Macro Fund did not have kurtosis is 
probably due to the effect of the financial crisis. This behavior  to generate 
positive skewness and slight leptokurtic  returns is expected of the Gobal Macro 
fund because they are not constrained to any hedge fund strategy. CSEQL and 
CSMNGFUT both displayed leptokutosis of 3.069346 and 3.047027 most 
probably due to their style of trading along the market movement 
 
All the hedge fund strategies examined displayed a Jarque Bera value greater than 
the chi square value. As a result we accept the Null hypothesis that the returns of 
the hedge fund strategy index are not normally distributed. Many empirical studies 
provide evidence for nonlinearity and non-normality of hedge funds' returns. 
Hedge funds on average have negative skewness and excess kurtosis, and the 
rejection rate of the Jarque-Bera (JB) test for normality is 40.5% to 85.9% 
depending on the test period and the database used (Cremers, Kritzman and Page 
(2005), Alexiev (2005), Bali, Gokcan and Liang (2006), Liang and Park (2007)). 
 
 In addition, this finding is in line with  the result of ,Bondarenko, O (2004) in his 
studies that, returns of most hedge funds exhibit negative exposure to the variance 
risk,i.e.,hedge funds “sell” variance.This negative exposure accounts for a large 
portion of hedge fund returns 6.5%per year for the whole  hedge fund industry .  
Kart, M.K(2004),  also recorded that  skewness and kurtosis  in hedge fund returns  
are the effect of survivorship biases and autocorrelation. Consequently mean 
returns are overstated and standard deviation understated .Therefore a misleading 
high Sharpe ratios may be generated  by hedge funds  due to effects of negative 
skewness and high kurtosis. This means that the relatively high mean and low 
standard deviation offered by hedge funds is not a free lunch. 
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Ho = the annual volatility of the hedge fund strategy index data are not normal 
 
Secondly, we find that the annual volatility of the hedge funds is high over the 
period under consideration. The S&P500 recorded the highest volatility compared 
to all the hedge funds. However, this result of the S&P 500 having  as high as 
19.07% compare to the highest of all the hedge fund; CSMgdFut (11.3%) which is 
also known to trade in direction of the market is expected. Since returns of hedge 
funds are not normally distributed like S&P 500, there is the possibility that 
ordinary standard deviation as a measure of risk will not capture all the risk in the 
hedge funds. It might be reasonable to infer  that volatility of all the hedge funds 
is understated. 
 
 A finding that is common to our result is that funds that basically speculates all 
such HFConArb (Convertible Arbitrage), CSFIINCARB (Fixed Income 
Arbitrage) CSMgdFut ( Managed Futures ) all have high volatility for the period. 
This indicated that the capital market was highly volatile over the period of 
financial crisis. 
Thirdly, the annual mean return for the period for the period was abysmally low 
for the S&P500 with 0.13%, this report is consistent with findings that the return 
of the S&P500 fell to its all time low since 1997, when it fell by 56% during the 
financial crisis. The least of the  hedge funds annual returns is higher compare to  
the market which confirms  report return of the hedge fund may fall in crisis. Even 
at that, the returns of hedge fund still generate better than the stock market. 
Intuitively, hedge fund may still fare better during crisis, but the result  should 
consider that the return distribution in hedge fund are not symmetry. Therefore 
this may not be totally reliable without applying other tools of performance 
measure to confirm this outcome. 
 
Overall, the CSGLMA yield the highest return per risk, with the lowest risk of 
6.74% per annum and highest annual mean return of 7.27%. This is expected 
because, of the existence of systematic risk which is diversifiable in the case of 
CSGLMA. CSGLMA has the unrestricted mandate to diversify into all other less 
risky economy. CSEVDRRISKARB has the next better performance with a mean 
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return of 3.17% and volatility of 4.26%. CSMGDFUT has annual mean return of 
4.39% but a high volatility of 11.35% because the hedge fund trades on market 
volatility. 
 
7.2 Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) 
Time series data are susceptible to non stationarity according to  John H. Cochrane, 
J.H( 1990), by non stationary we mean; the mean and variance across time in the data 
range are not equal. Such effects are not desirable in financial model. The effect of 
modeling with a non stationary time series data is that the outcome can be a 
misrepresentative of other samples. 
Many tests have been devised to distinguish whether a series is difference-stationary 
(or contains a unit root in its autoregressive representation) and should be first 
differenced or whether it is trend-stationary and should be detrend. Dickey and 
Fuller{ (1979), Dickey, Bell, and Miller (19861, Phillips (19871, Phillips and Perron 
(1986), and Lo and Ma&inlay (1988), John H. Cochrane, J.H( 1990), } are a small 
sample. 
Although, {Schwert (1987), Lo and Ma&inlay (19891, Blough (1988), John H. 
Cochrane, J.H( 1990), } and others have documented that tests for unit roots or trend 
stationarity can have low power against some specific alternatives. Essentially, they 
show that tests for a unit root have low power in finite samples against the local 
alternative of a root close to but below unity.Still, test for unit root is of wide 
application in time series studies in finance. We apply the unit root or stationary test 
in this study to the seven hedge fund strategy index. The results are displayed in 
(APPENDIX TAB2). 
 
                                                                       INSERT TABLE 2 
 
     Ho =Returns of hedge fund strategy index has not unit root 
 
     Findings – test for stationary (ADF) 
Out finding suggest that all hedge fund are non stationary as depicted by the evident 
from the graph. For each of the hedge funds, the test for stationary display the t 
statistic probability is >5% and the ADF test statistics is less than the critical values at 
all the levels of the intercept , intercept and trend and Null for the first level of the 
data i.e the raw data. Here we reject that the time series data of the seven hedge fund 
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indexes are stationary. We cannot accept null; that the hedge fund data did not have a 
unit root or the data are not stationary. Because, the decision criteria is that the P 
value <5% and the ADF test statistics should be greater than the critical value at the 
1%, 5% and 10% in our case. 
In order to correct the stationary data, we apply the first difference using the Schwatz 
criterion on the log of the data; the non stationary was removed at first difference for 
each of the seven hedge fund strategy indexes. 
 
7.3 Autocorrelation correction 
Ho = There is no serial correlation of any order in the residual of the regression of the 
six risk proxies, regressed on the individual hedge fund strategy index. 
 
Firstly, we draw a line graph to infer there is relationship between the different risk 
proxies and hedge fund strategy indexes. The relationship is weak as indicated by the 
graph. But suppose that this was due to data frequency which is in months and not in 
days. Credit Suisse data base does not report hedge fund returns in day or weeks. The 
result of the line graph is displayed below: 
Chart9: Relationship between Risk factors and Hedge Funds 
 
 
Further, expectedly in a time series model, there should be the effect of 
autocorrelation. Since the data are already corrected for staionarity. Next, by taking 
the line graph of each of the data as indicated in GRAPH 1, the trend in the data 
indicates the presence of autocorrelation.  
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Chart10: Graph of Residual of Regression after Removal of Serial Correlation (HF). 
 
The autocorrelation effect must be removed in order to avoid a misleading output/ 
model from a regression. We apply the Breuch Godfrey test  to the residual of the 
returns of each of the variables  as risk factors regressed on the individual hedged 
fund index. The outcome confirms the result of the graph that the regression has 
autocorrelation. In order to correct the autocorrelation effect, we take a first difference 
of the variables dependent and independent with two lags . The graph of the 
distribution for each of the data suggested that the effect of autocorrelation has been 
removed Chart 10 & 11.  
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Chart11: Graph of Residual after the Removal of Serial Correlation (Risk Factors) 
 
We proceeded to run the regression. Next, by conducting the Breusch Godfrey test on 
the residual of the new equations after the first difference, the effect of autocorrelation 
has been removed due to first difference. With the result before  the correction, we 
reject the Null hypothesis that our regression did not have autocorrelation effect. SEE 
APPENDIX for the result the Residual of  the regression before and after Correction. 
 
                                                      INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Next, we observed the  following results  for the hedge fund strategies index. The 
result for DYCSEQLS or CSEQLS explained only S&P 500 has a significant effect 
on the performance of CSEQLS. The coefficient of the relationship between S&P500 
and CSEQLS is a positive  of 0.339737. This suggest that a 0.339737 in the 
movement of S&P500 will explain the returns or increase in  the NAV of  CSEQLS 
and a negative movement in the CSEQLS will be explained by the movement of S&P 
in the same direction. . The equation has a p value of 0.0000; that it is statistically 
significant to explain the movement of CSEQLS. The other variables do not explain 
the movement of the CSEQLS as they do not show a significant relationship, each of 
the other risk factors have p value greater than 5%. In addition the regression is fitted 
because it has a R value of 0.672030  or 67% and R square of 0.635589 or 63%. The 
criteria is a minimum of R value of 50% for the regression to be valid. The 
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implication of this relationship is that it is only the equity  market movement explains  
the value generation  in  CSEQLS ( the equity long/ short) strategy index during the 
period under consideration. The result is expected because the equity long/short 
strategy  speculate on the movement of the marker to generate value to investors. 
However, all the risk proxies are considered jointly significant to explain the 
relationship  of the NAV of CSEQLS; give  the F(statistics)  of 0.0000. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
In the case of DCSEVDRRISKARB or the Event Driven Risk Arbitrage of the Credit 
Suisse; the most significant risk factor again for DCSEVDRRISKARB is the S&P500 
with the P value of 0.0030.  But the S&P 500 has just a positive correlation coefficient 
of 0.084738 or 8%. The result suggests that the addition in value to the Credit Suisse 
Event Driven Risk Arbitrage can only be affected by equity market movement by 8%. 
Another risk proxy which shows a significant relationship with the Event Driven Risk 
Arbitrage is the USINDEX (a proxy that measure the relationship of unit of currency 
exchange with the major traded currencies).  
 
However in the case of DCSEVDRRISKARB, the relationship is a negative 
relationship with a coefficient of -0.241959 that is -24%. The relationship display a 
movement in the opposite direction with the DCSEVDRRISKARB. If the value of the 
DCSEVDRRISKARB should increase by one, given the existing condition; then, 
there should be a fall in the value of the dollar relative to other currency by 24%. This 
may also imply that an increase in the interest rate of the dollar will cause a value loss 
in the NAV generated by the DCSEVDRRISKARB.  
 
In addition the investment manager’s skill may be considered necessary in the case of 
DCSEVDRRISKARB. A significant p value of 0.0191 for   positive relationship or 
coefficient of 0.002875 is observed for the alpha or intercept value. The implication 
of this result is that the skill of the hedge fund managers is relevant in the case of 
DCSEVDRRISKARB. The R value of 0.502208 or 50% show the regression is fit 
enough to explain the relationship among the dependent and independent variables. 
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Also the Probabilistic F statistics showed that all the risk proxies can jointly explain 
the performance of DCSEVDRRISKARB. 
 
The result for the DCSHFI suggest that only the S&P 500 and the DUSINDEXTB 
(US index) are significant at 0.000 and 0.0023 respectively for a coefficient value of 
0.173282 or 17% and -.0.469631 or -47% . The R and R square of 0.696260 (69.6%) 
and 0.662511 (66.2%) are sufficient to show that the regression is fit to explain the 
relationship among the variables. 
The result in DCSMGDFUT  suggest that neither the regression nor any of the risk 
proxies was good enough to explain the performance of the Credit Suisse Managed 
Futures strategy for the period under consideration. This is evident from the value of 
the P value displayed by each of the proxies and the R and R square values. 
 
In the case of DHFCONARB (Credit Suisse Convertible Arbitrage) index, two risk 
proxies are considered significant enough to explain the performance of the fund for 
the period under consideration. The factors are the S&P500 and the Moody spread. 
The S&P 500 is significant at 0.0128 for a positive coefficient of 0.165702 or 16.5% 
and for Moody which has a significance level of 0.0234 and negative relationship of -
0.132702 or -13.3%. The R and R square of 0.604443 and 0.560492 respectively 
implies that the regression is fit to explain the relationship among the variables. 
 
For DCSFIINCARB (Credit Suisse Fixed Income Arbitrage ) hedge fund index, three 
factor are significant enough to explain the performance of the DCSFIINCARB for 
the period. The factors are the S&P500, Moody and the USINDEX. The S&P 500 has 
P value 0.0120 and coefficient of 0.142479 or 14.2%, the Moody has a p value of 
0.0426 and a coefficient of - 0.100587 of -10%, the USINDEX  may also be 
considered significant with a significant p of 0.0506 and coefficient of -0.436703 or -
.43.6%. Both R and R square are reasonable at 0.600726 (60%) and 0556362 or 
(55.6%). 
Finally, for the DCSGLMA (Credit Suisse Global Macro ) Hedge  Fund Index on the 
DUSINDEXTB with a negative coefficient of -0.514596 is significant  by 0.0216. 
Although the F statistics of 0.027436 show that all the variables may are jointly 
significant to explain the performance of DCSGMA. 
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INSERT TABLE 5 
7.4 Autocorrelation as a measure of Illiquidity risk  
No study of hedge fund performance has explicitly figured in credit or liquidity risk as 
a source of return, despite the fact that some hedge funds virtually live off it. Since the 
autocorrelation found in hedge fund returns is primarily a result of marking to market 
in illiquidity market. There is relationship between autocorrelation and alpha. 
Measuring the magnitudes of serial autocorrelation order  observe the illiquidity in 
hedge funds. Since hedge funds are not valued matching to market, research has 
shown that the performance return smooth by hedge fund managers is a  major cause 
of autocorrelation. We there examine the first “six order” (1…..6) of the 
autocorrelation of the first difference of the hedge fund strategy indexes and the L 
Jung Box (1978) Value. The result confirm in most of the cases of the hedge funds 
that the autocorrelation/ illiquidity is higher in the time of crisis than the pre crisis 
period 2002 April – 2006 May.  
 
Specifically, we present the result of finding in TABLE 6. The table explain the 
varying effect of time events (financial crisis) on hedge fund strategy indexes return. 
Comparison the order of correlation of the first difference o f hedge fund indexes for 
the two periods under consideration suggest that serial correlation is higher for the 
periods  among six out of the seven hedge fund indexes. Except in the case of 
Managed future hedge fund index (CSMGDFUT) where a different  result Is quite 
expected as future trading are more liquid in nature. 
 
From the table 6,  p1…6 represent the correlation  order 1…6 for each of the years 
during financial crisis June 2007 – July 2012. , p1.2.… p 1.6 represent the correlation  
order  for each of the years during financial crisis April 2001 – May  2006.The L Jung 
box (1978) Q statistics also suggest that the value are higher for each fund in the crisis 
period compare to pre crisis periods. The result that show the comparison for the first 
order are  highlighted here DCSEVDRRISKARB (0.316: 0.297), DCSFIINCARB 
(0.565: 0.305), DCSGLMA(0.22: 0.003), CDSHFI(0.409: 0.193), DHFCONARB 
(0.55: 0.438), DYCSEQLS(0.247: 0.224) but the CSMGDFUT is different (-0.088: 
0.089)  where the financial crisis serial correlation is lower. Also , it can be observed 
that the Arbitrage strategies are most  illiquid during the financial  crisis, probably 
because of the downward trend in the stock market or fall in prices of the stocks. The 
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autocorrelation or illiquidity in global macro fund DCSGLMA and ), DYCSEQLS are 
lower because the DCSGLMA can diversify to other market and the effect regular 
trading due to volatility of market must have reduce the illiquidity in the equity long 
/short strategy index DYCSEQLS 
 
Ho = The serial autocorrelation in the hedge funds returns pre crisis is not different 
for hedge fund during financial crisis 
 
We therefore reject the null hypothesis that serial autocorrelation in the hedge funds 
returns pre crisis  is not different for hedge fund during financial crisis 
 
8.0 Conclusion and Recommendation 
This paper estimates the risk factors loading as a test on hedge fund strategy indexes. 
Particular it focuses on the effect of financial crisis on hedge fund in the United States 
during the current financial crisis that started 2007.We attempt to answer these 
questions aimed at responding to the question: Does financial economic crisis affected 
the superlative performance of hedge funds? Does the risk of hedge fund increase due 
to the exogeneuous shock of the financial crisis? Does any risk factor play a more 
significant role in the performance of hedge funds across strategies? Does illiquidity 
in hedge funds increase during the financial crisis? 
 
The result of the study indicates that superlative performance of hedge funds dropped 
in the financial Crisis. This is evidence from the graph where there was deep drop 
particularly between 2007 -2009 third quarter. The same result is confirmed in the 
annualized mean return of the hedge fund strategies. Although, the effect  vary across 
different strategies, the position of the literature that hedge fund returns more than the 
market during bear market is established. S&P500 annualized return is the lowest of 
all the assets. 
Secondly, we find that the hedge fund risk rose during the financial crisis. Although 
funds such as the global macro could diversify to reduce volatility, managed future 
funds is better too in terms of volatility. Despite the high volatility due to market 
uncertainty in financial crisis, the empirical evidence suggest that hedge fund perform 
better that the S&P500 and may be a safe haven for investors during such financial 
crisis. 
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In the risk factor model, the result suggest that three factors have a more significant of 
the performance of the hedge funds. The factors are the equity market trading (S&P 
500), the credit spread (Moody) and the liquidity factors as explained by (USINDEX). 
Both the Moody and the USINDEX in most of the case displayed an inverse 
relationship (β) to the performance of the relevant hedge fund indexes. This result is 
expected because both retrain in credit market and illiquidity characterized the 
financial crisis. Increase in systematic risk will increase borrowing rate and invariably 
the credit spread. The illiquidity is expected to reduce trading activities due to lack of 
funding. The evidence in the S&P500 in our case better explain the market movement 
during the period of financial crisis. 
 
A further test to measure the effect of illiquidity using the L Jung box (1976) suggest 
that there was a rise in the illiquidity of the market during the period of financial crisis 
and pre financial crisis. The Q statistics value also attest to this result. The liquidity 
nature of managed future funds presented a better position as the liquidity was more 
in the crisis than in the pre crisis. 
 
On the whole, the financial crisis affect hedge funds returns but they still perform 
better than the traditional asset classes in terms of annualized returns and volatility. 
Also the credit factor and the illiquidity factors have major impact on performance of 
hedge funds for the period. Therefore base on these findings and given the existing 
conditions, investors may still prefer hedge funds as a safe haven during financial 
crisis. 
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